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NEW BRUNSWICK LAND LAW*
Gerard V. La Forest!
A System of Conveyancing
The first point to observe about the New Brunswick Reg­
istry Act is that it is not simply a means of recording documents; 
it also provides for a system of conveyancing, in fact the ordinary 
means of conveyancing in the province. To fully understand the 
significance of this system of conveyancing it is necessary to 
examine alternative forms of conveyancing, beginning with these 
known in England from the earliest times. I make no apology for 
refreshing your memory about this because, as you will see, it is, 
necessary to an understanding of some of the cases I will be 
discussing.
The oldest form of conveyance known to the common law 
is the feoffment with livery of seisin. It was, as the name im­
plies, the delivery of seisin —  the feudal counterpart of possession. 
The donor and donee would come on the land and the donor 
would formally deliver up possession of it, by giving the 
donee a tuft of earth, or by some other formality. Usually the 
occurence would be recorded in writing in a charter of feoffment, 
but the writing was not essential to the validity of the transfer. 
The New Brunswick case of M'Lardy v. Flaherty1 (perhaps one 
of the few recorded cases relating to an actual feoffment on this 
continent)2 provides a convenient example. There the donor was 
passing on the street in front of the lot in question. He said to 
Flaherty, “Here is your estate: it don’t belong to me at all, I 
have deeded it back to you"’. Flaherty then took hold of one of 
the posts, the remains of an old building that had been standing 
on the lot, and said he thought he would repair the building and 
put some tenants in. Flaherty then apparently went into the house. 
“This, coupled with what he said”, asserted Chipman C. J., 
“would . . . amount to an entry after Ray [the donor 1 had told 
him there was his estate.”3
* This paper substantially reproduces a talk given to the mid-winter 
meeting o f the Canadian Bar Association (N .B . Branch) in February, 
1960. Since the author has had a number o f recent requests for it, 
it was thought it might usefully be published.
t  Gerard V. La Forest, Q.C., Dean o f Law, University of Alberta.
1 (1 8 4 7 ), 5 N .B.R . 455.
2 See Berry v. Berry  (1 8 8 2 ), 16 N .S.R. 66, at p. 79.
3 (1 8 4 7 ), 5 N .B.R . 455, at p. 460.
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The feoffment was not just a way of conveying land. It was 
for many years the ordinary way. It was impossible at common 
law to convey a fee simple or other freehold estate in possession 
by deed. As it was put technically, such estates, or as they were 
called, “corporeal hereditaments”, lay in livery and not in grant.
The feoffment was inconvenient in several respects. It re­
quired actual entry on the land by both parties at the time it was 
made. It also required that it be open and public; otherwise it 
would be difficult to prove.
For this reason lawyers developed a new form of convey­
ance, the lease and release, which consisted in giving a lease of 
the land to be conveyed followed soon afterwards by a release. 
Here is how it operated. A lease did not convey seisin, so livery 
was not required. And a reversion, unlike an estate in possession, 
could be conveyed by a grant, i.e., by deed, at common law be­
cause it was impossible to give livery of seisin (o r possession) of 
an estate that arose in the future. The donor, therefore, gave a 
lease to the donee for, say, one year. The donee then entered the 
land and took possession. All that remained in the donor, then, 
was the reversion of the fee simple. This reversion he would then 
release (or give up) to the grantee in possession by deed of grant. 
The lease then merged with the reversion and the donee acquired 
the whole fee simple. This method of conveyance was an improve­
ment over the feoffment, but it required that the donee should 
actually enter the land under the lease, for until entry the donee 
had only an interesse termini and the release would not operate. 
This was as far as conveyances had developed before the intro­
duction of the use in the Chancellor’s Court of Chancery, if one 
excepts such unusual types of conveyances as the fictitious actions 
of fine and recovery.
The use, you will remember, was the predecessor of the trust. 
Land was conveyed to a nominal owner by feoffment to the use 
of the person who it was intended should have the beneficial 
enjoyment (the cestui que use). The common law courts recog­
nized the title of the nominal owner only, but the Court of Chan­
cery in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction would enforce the 
use. Equity would also hold that a use resulted under certain 
circumstances even though not express, a doctrine that gave rise 
to the system of conveyancing known as the “bargain and sale” . 
This was a contract, oral or written, under which a man, A. 
agreed to convey land to another, B, B having paid valuable 
consideration therefor. As soon as this contract was made, equity 
would say that A held the land under a resulting use for B. In
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other words the equitable title to the land passed to B, the cestui 
que use. The legal title, however, remained in A.
But the Statute of Uses, 1535, provided that thenceforth the 
cestui que use should be deemed to have the seisin, that is the 
legal estate.4 So it became possible by the bargain and sale to 
convey the legal title in land. This would have made possible the 
conveyance of land by a simple oral contract. But this result was 
perceived and steps were taken to prevent it. For the secret 
transfers that would have been possible by this means would have 
prevented the King from collecting the feudal dues to which he was 
entitled from landowners; to collect these it was necessary that 
the King know who the landowners were. So at the same session 
of Parliament that passed the Statute of Uses the Statute of 
Enrolments was also passed providing that a bargain and sale 
should be void unless in writing, indented, and sealed and enrolled 
within six months in His Majesty’s Courts at Westminster.5
But conveyancers were finally successful in devising a secret 
method of land transfer, the bargain and sale of a lease and re­
lease. A would agree to sell B a lease. This would raise a use in 
the lease in favour of B, which by the Statute of Uses was con­
verted into a legal title to the lease in B without entry; enrolment 
was unnecessary because the Statute of Enrolments did not apply 
to leaseholds. A then released his reversion to B and B had the 
whole fee simple.
These, then, were the major types of conveyances in effect 
in England at the time New Brunswick was settled, and since 
colonists carry with them such of the laws of England as are 
applicable to their situation and conditions, these modes of con­
veyancing became and are part of the law of New Brunswick. This 
is made clear in such cases M'Lardy v. Flaherty, Doe d. Hanning- 
ton v. M ’Fadden* and Doe d. Wilt v. Jardine7. But it is obvious 
that such forms of conveyances would be far too complicated for 
the needs of a frontier land like early New Brunswick. Accord­
ingly, in the Registry Act, which was passed at the first session 
of the House of Assembly in 1786, section 10 was enacted to 
remedy the situation.8 That provision now appears as section 39 
of the existing Act, which reads as follows:
4 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (Im p .).
5 27 Hen. 8, c. 16 (Im p .).
« (1 8 3 6 ), 2 N.B.R. 153.
7 (1 8 3 6 ), 2 N.B.R. 142.
8 26 G eo. I l l , c. 3, s. 10 (N .B .)
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Every conveyance, duly acknowledged or proved and registered 
according to the law in force at the time o f the registration, shall 
be effectual for the transferring o f the land therein described and 
the possession thereof, according to the intent o f such conveyance 
without livery o f seisin or any other act.9
The effect of this section was settled in Doe d. Wilt v. Jar- 
dine10 in 1835. There A had given a registered deed to B that 
read in part that the grantor “do demise, release and quit claim” 
the land in question unto the grantee his “heirs and assigns for­
ever”. It was argued that the deed was not effectual to convey 
the land. It could not operate as a release (in which form it was) 
because it was not preceded by a lease. And it could not operate 
as a bargain and sale because it was not enrolled as required by 
the Statute of Enrolments. It was held, however, that the deed, 
being registered, was effectual to pass the fee simple, that being 
its obvious intent. To be good under the Registry Act it is not 
necessary, to use the language of Chipman C. J., for a convey­
ance to “tally with some technical form of conveyance known to 
the law of the mother country.”11 This, of course, does not mean 
that one can convey a fee simple without appropriate words of 
limitation as was argued in Jack v. Lyons ;12 the words “and his 
heirs” or nowadays “in fee simple”13 must be used. It does mean, 
however, that a registered instrument need not conform with earlier 
technical forms of conveyancing or use particular words expressing 
the transfer, so long as the words denote that the land in question 
is being conveyed.
Because of its lack of technicality it is not surprising that 
conveyancing by registered instrument became the ordinary —  in­
deed the almost exclusive —  means of conveyancing in New Bruns­
wick. But what of the ordinary deed that is not registered? Was 
this not sufficient in the absence of statute to pass title as between 
the parties? The point came up in Doe d. Hannington v. M ’Fad- 
den.u  There it was sought to establish the validity of an unregis­
tered deed of mortgage that was almost identical to that in use to­
day. It could not possibly be a feoffment, or a lease and release, 
because the mortgagor had, of course, never given up possession. 
But it was strenuously argued that it was a valid bargain and 
sale which passed the legal title under the Statute of Uses, a
» R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 195, s. 39.
10 (1 8 3 6 ), 2 N .B.R . 142.
11 Ibid.. at p. 146.
»2 (1 8 7 9 ), 19 N .B.R . 336.
13 Property Act, R .S.N.B. 1952, c. 177, s. 1 1 (3 ).  
(1 8 3 6 ), 2 N .B.R . 153.
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statute which, it was further argued, applied to New Brunswick. 
With this contention the court agreed, but it also went on to point 
out that the deed had not been enrolled in the court as required by 
the Statute of Enrolments. The deed was, therefore, held void.15
It was not until 1904 that the ordinary unregistered deed 
became effective to pass title to land in possession in New Bruns­
wick.16 The relevant section now appears as section 9 (2 ) of the 
Property Act which reads as follows:
A ll corporeal tenements and hereditaments shall, as regards the 
conveyance o f the immediate freehold thereof, be deemed to lie 
in grant as well as in livery.17
But surely, you may say, there must have been many deeds 
before 1904 that were never registered. And then it may occur 
to you that the Statute of Limitations might be of some help in 
validating the deed. However, the Statute of Limitations only ap­
plies when the person in possession holds adversely of the owner, 
and here, far from doing so, he holds with the consent of the 
owner. Only when the owner sells to a third person can it be 
argued that he holds adversely, but the third person is likely to 
acquire immediate possession so the limitation period has hardly 
time to start, let alone expire. The logic of this argument was up­
held in two Supreme Court of New Brunswick cases, Parson v. 
Good1* and Carson v. McMahon.™
The courts, however, found a solution in a much older prin­
ciple that transcends the whole of the common law: that a right
,s  See also D oe d. Burnham  v. W atts (1 8 4 3 ), 4 N.B.R. 441. It is inter­
esting to note that in an early Manitoba case (Sinclair v. Mulligan
(1 8 8 6 ), 3 Man. R. 481, a ffd  (1 8 8 8 ), 5 Man. R. 17) it was held that 
the Statute o f Enrolments was not applicable though the Statute o f  
Uses was. Though technical reasons are found for this the underlying 
reason for this difference probably is that bargains and sales were the 
only convenient modes of conveyance in the early years o f  that province. 
In N ova Scotia, in fact, voluntarly deeds have had, rather clumsily, to be 
upheld as being valid by a local variation in the com m on law: it 
appears doubtful whether either the Statute o f Uses or the Statute o f  
Enrolments is in force there (see Berry v. Berry (1 8 8 2 ), 16 N.S.R. 66; 
see also Shey v. Chisolm  (1 8 5 3 ), 2 N.S.R. 5 2 ). In N ew  Brunswick, 
on the other hand, a registered deed was a convenient mode o f con­
veyancing and a holding that bargains and sales were valid would have 
interfered with that system somewhat by permitting valid conveyances 
outside it.
»6 C.S.N.B. 1903, c. 152, s. 11.
*7 R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 177, s. 9 (2 ) .
18 (1 8 4 6 ), 5 N.B.R. 272.
19 (1 9 4 0 ), 15 M.P.R. 109, citing M cV ity  v. Tranouth, [1908] A.C. 60.
6 U.N.B. L A W  JO U R N A L
long enjoyed must have had a lawful origin. In this particular 
situation the courts presumed a feoffment after a long possession, 
say about 20 years:—  “Livery of seisin, though the fact be not 
endorsed on the deed of feoffment, will be presume« where the 
deed has gone according to the feoffment for a great length of 
time”. This reasoning has been adopted in at least two New 
Brunswick cases, Cairns v. Horsman20 and Carson v. McMahon,21 
but the doctrine could not apply in cases like Doe d. Hannington v. 
M'Fadden because a mortgagee does not, of course, normally go 
into possession. I have little doubt, too, that where a deed was 
given for valuable consideration, the courts of equity would hold 
that the grantee had an equitable interest and the deed would 
satisfy the need of writing required by the Statute of Frauds. Of 
course, such an equitable title could be defeated by a person who 
bona fide purchased the legal estate for value without notice of 
the existing equitable estate even if he did not register, or by a 
subsequent purchaser of an equitable estate if his instrument was 
first registered.
Nevertheless, you may now be beginning to see why I lay 
stress on our registered deeds as constituting a mode of convey­
ancing. The implications of this fact did not end with the statute 
of 1904 making unregistered deeds valid. The Registry Act 
still continues to govern the forms of our deeds and our con­
veyancing practice. The acknowledgment before a justice, notary 
or judge, or indeed any witness, is only required for the purpose of 
registration. A deed is certainly valid without these formalities. 
The only requirements of form to effect a conveyance under sec­
tion 9 (2 ) of the Property Act is that it be in writing and be 
signed, sealed and delivered as required in part by the common 
law and in part by the Statute of Frauds; it need not even be 
witnessed.22 The New Brunswick deed, whether registered or not, 
could be immensely simplified and be equally valid. As was said 
of a similar document in a Nova Scotia case, our usual deed uses 
the language of almost every species of conveyance known to Eng­
lish law and a few extra words as well, yet it does not necessarily 
conform with the requirements of any of these conveyances (as 
we saw in Doe d. Hannington v. M ’Fadden), and any one word 
such as “convey” would be sufficient.23
2« (1 9 0 1 ), 35 N .B.R . 436.
2* (1 9 4 6 ), 15 M.P.R. 109.
22 D oe d. Sherlock v. Powers (1 8 6 5 ), 11 N.B R. 232.
23 Bern' v. Berry (1 8 8 2 ), 16 N.S.R. 66.
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Priorities
The second point to observe about the Registry Act is that it 
established a new system of priorities among conveyances. At 
common law, the rule was simple: first in time, first in right. If I 
conveyed Blackacre to A today and tomorrow conveyed it to B, 
A’s conveyance prevailed. As to equitable estates, equity generally 
followed the law except that where a subsequent purchaser for 
value without notice acquired the legal estate, his interest would 
prevail over a preceding equitable estate.
Section 27 (1 ) of the Registry Act has altered this. It reads:
All instruments may be registered in the counties where the lands 
lie, and if not so registered, shall . . .  be deemed fraudulent and 
void against subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration 
whose conveyances are previously registered.24
To gain priority over an earlier instrument, the section requires two 
things: prior registration and valuable consideration. Now what is 
valuable consideration? This is interpreted in Carson v. M c­
Mahon25 as meaning any consideration that would support an 
ordinary contract. The consideration need not, therefore, be a 
money consideration;26 nor need it be adequate,27 or have been 
fully paid at the time action is brought.9* But both Carson v. Mc­
Mahon29 and Payson v. Good30 make it clear that the consideration 
must be bona fide. I suggest, therefore, that a nominal consid­
eration might not be enough, for the disproportion between the 
price and the value of a thing may be so great as to be evidence 
of fraud. The conclusion that nominal consideration is not valuable 
consideration is supported to some extent by the Upper Canada 
case of Wilkinson v. Conklin.31
In any case, proof that valuable consideration has been paid 
must be given by the subsequent purchaser who seeks the benefit 
of the priority given by the Registry Act.32 Further, the fact that 
the registered deed relates that consideration (valuable or nom­
24 R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 195, s. 2 7 (1 ) .
25 (1 9 4 6 ), 15 M.P.R. 109; see also Payson  v. G ood  (1 8 4 6 ), 5 N.B.R. 272.
26 See Fraser v. Sutherland (1 8 5 1 ) , 2 Gr. 442; Patulo  v. Bovington  
(1 8 5 4 ), 4 U .C .C P  125; Johnston  v. R eid  (1 8 8 1 ), 29 Gr. 293
27 See Payson v. G ood  (1 8 4 6 ), 5 N .B.R . 272.
28 See Carson v. M cM ahon  (1 9 4 6 ), 15 M.P.R. 109.
29 Ibid.
30 (1 8 4 6 ), 5 N .B.R . 272.
(1 8 6 0 ), 10 U.C.C.P. 211.
32 See Payson v. G ood  (1 8 4 6 ), 5 N .B.R . 272; D oe d. Cronk & Skae v. 
Smith (1 8 5 0 ), 7 U.C.Q.B. 376; G rant v. G illingham , [1942] ! D  L.R. 
421; M arriott v. Feener, [19501 1 D.L.R. 837.
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inal) was given is no evidence against a person claiming under an 
earlier unregistered deed (unless, of course, he puts the registered 
deed in evidence himself).33 Such a recital can only be evidence 
against a party to the deed.34 From this you can see that it may 
become very difficult to prove consideration where the deed was 
made a long time ago.
Section 2 7 (1 ) , therefore, requires that to gain priority the 
subsequent purchaser must affirmatively prove that valuable con­
sideration has been paid for the registered conveyance. That is 
all the section requires. What, however, happens if the subsequent 
purchaser knows, or has knowledge of facts which should have put 
him on his notice of an earlier conveyance? Well the rule at com­
mon law was, it seems, that if the purchaser came within the sec­
tion, he had priority and his knowledge of an earlier unregistered 
deed made no difference.3* But this was more than the courts of 
equity could stomach. Courts of equity held that a registered con­
veyance for valuable consideration would be defeated if the grantee 
had actual notice of an earlier unregistered transaction.38 Now 
actual notice means just that. For example, possession by the 
person who holds the registered deed has been held not enough 
to give notice to others. An excellent definition appears in Fer­
guson v. Zinn37 where Kingstone J. said:
The distinction between constructive and actual notice is o f course 
well defined. Actual notice is knowledge not presumed as in the 
case o f constructive notice but shown to be actually brought home 
to the party to be charged with it . . .  .
Constructive notice is defined as notice o f  such facts as should 
have put one on his guard.38
Consequently, while the two things that must be proved to give 
priority over a previous instrument, registry and valuable consid­
eration. may be there, the registered document may still be de­
feated if the previous purchaser can establish actual knowledge 
by the grantee under the registered deed.
Though possession does not defeat a registered title by being 
treated as notice, it may constitute evidence of notice. Moreover,
*» Bondy  v. Fox (1 8 6 9 ), 29 U.C.Q.B. 64.
See Pavson  v. G o o d  (1 8 4 6 ), 5 N .B.R . 272; Barber v. M cK ay  (1 8 9 0 ),
19 O.R. 46; M ariott v. Feener, [1950] 1 D.L.R. 837.
:u See Parks v. Ingraham  (1 8 7 9 ), 19 N .B.R . 195.
™ R oss v. H unter (1 8 8 2 ), 7 S.C.R. 289; N ew  Brunswick Railway Co.
v. K elly  (1 8 9 6 ), 26 S.C.R. 341.
3- [1933] 1 D.L.R. 300.
™ Ibid.. at p. 308.
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as already pointed out, courts will treat long possession as having 
originated in a feoffment with livery of seisin. Will the courts 
permit such a presumed feoffment to override the claims of a sub­
sequent purchaser under a registered deed? The point came up in 
Carson v. M c M a h o n in 1940, of which a simplified version of 
the facts is as follows. In 1894, the defendant received a deed 
to the lot in question from one Wesley Nesbitt and took possession 
of the property. The deed was never recorded. Wesley Nesbitt 
(the grantor) died and his children did not know he had sold the 
lot to the defendant, so they conveyed it to their aunt in 1916 who, 
two years later, granted it to one Doore. Both deeds were reg­
istered, but there was no evidence of any consideration (hardly sur­
prising when one considers how long before the dispute the matter 
came up). Doore died in 1931 leaving the land to his daughter 
by a will which was also registered. The daughter then sold to the 
plaintiff for valuable consideration, and the plaintiff registered his 
deed. The plaintiff had no knowledge of the defendant’s unreg­
istered conveyance and sued for recovery of the land. On the 
face of it, the plaintiff seemed to have a good case. The defend­
ant’s deed was invalid, having been made before 1904 and not 
having been registered. Further, a Privy Council case, M cVity v. 
Tranouth,40 had decided that the Statute of Limitations could not 
assist the defendant because the first registered deed proved to be 
for valuable consideration was in 1931, and it was only from that 
period that the defendant could be said to have held adversely of 
the plaintiff. But the court nonetheless held for the defendant. He 
had, they pointed out, been in possession since 1894; after 
such a long possession a feoffment would be presumed. The Reg­
istry Act would defeat a written instrument such as a deed, but a 
feoffment was not a written instrument.
It is possible that this situation could arise in the case of an 
unrecorded deed made since 1904. It is true that since that time 
a feoffment must, by section 10(1) of the Property Act, be evi­
denced by deed, but it certainly can be argued that though the 
deed may be void under section 27 (1 ) of the Registry Act as an 
instrument conveying title it does not prevent it from evidencing 
a valid feoffment.
However that may be, and despite the broad definition given 
to the word instrument by section 1 (a) of the Registry Act, the 
Act only arranges priority as between persons claiming priority 
under written instruments. Thus it has been held that a prior
39 (1 9 4 6 ), 15 M.P.R. 109.
[1908] A  C. 60.
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equitable mortgage created by a transfer of the title deeds took 
priority over a registered conveyance for valuable consideration 
even when the arrangement for the surrender of the title deeds was 
reduced to writing and not registered.41 Similarly, other rights 
taking effect by operation of law rather than under written in­
struments have been known to take priority over subsequent reg­
istered deeds, given for valuable consideration.42 In some prov­
inces this has been remedied by a section such as the following:
N o  equitable lien, charge or interest affecting land is valid as 
against a registered instrument executed by the same person, his 
heirs and assigns . . . .43
But there is no such section in the New Brunswick Act.
Public Notice of Conveyance
Finally, the Registry Act provides a public means of giving 
notice of conveyances. Section 68 provides that registration con­
stitutes notice to persons acquiring an interest in the land subse­
quent to registration. While the section appears clear, it raises 
considerable difficulty. I will not go into the whole matter, but 
will limit myself to stating that it is not notice for all purposes,44 
and to examining briefly the two New Brunswick cases on the 
section. The first is Carroll v. Rogers.45 There one Elizabeth 
McLaughlin acquired a piece of land from one Loggie by reg­
istered deed in 1893. In 1894 she sold a portion of it to the 
plaintiff who did not register his deed. Two years later Mrs. Mc­
Laughlin mortgaged the remaining land to one Sproule. The de­
scription in this mortgage followed the original description of the 
whole lot, but “excepted the portion sold and conveyed by” Mrs. 
McLaughlin to the plaintiff by the unregistered deed. The defend­
ant, who had no knowledge of the plaintiffs claim, registered his 
title. At the trial he argued that he thereby had a claim to the 
whole lot. The plaintiff, for his part, maintained that since the 
mortgage to Sproule, which was registered, excepted the convey­
ance to the plaintiff, the defendant should be deemed to have 
notice of the plaintiffs claim by virtue of section 68 of the Registry
41 Harrison v. A rm ou r  (1 8 6 5 ), 11 Gr. 303.
«  See Israel v. L eith  (1 8 9 0 ), 20 O.R. 361.
43 See R.S.O. 1960, c. 348, s. 78: see Toronto  v. Jarvis (1 8 9 5 ), 25 S.C.R. 
237. This section applies only to equitable estates, not legal rights 
created, for exam ple, by feoffm ent or easements arising by operation 
of law.
44 See Pierce v. Canada Permanent Loan and Savings Co. (1 8 9 4 ), 25
O.R. 671, a f fd  (1 8 9 6 ) , 23 O.A.R. 516 (further advances under a 
mortgage ).
15 (1 9 0 0 ), 2 N .B . Eq. 159.
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Act. The court accepted this, giving the plaintiffs earlier unreg­
istered deed priority over the defendant’s registered conveyance 
simply because the plaintiff’s conveyance was referred to in a 
registered instrument.
The application of this decision was explained in Carson v. 
McMahon.46 There, it will be remembered, the defendant claimed 
title under an old unregistered deed whereas the plaintiff claimed 
under a recent registered deed. The argument from long possession 
( which succeeded) was not the sole ground advanced by the plain­
tiff. He had, after he had obtained the land under his unregistered 
deed, sold the land to a pulp company which subsequently recon- 
veyed to him. The deeds to and from the pulp company were 
registered before the defendant obtained his deed. The plaintiff 
therefore argued that the defendant should be deemed to have 
notice of his title by virtue of section 68 of the Registry Act. But 
the court held otherwise, because in searching title in the normal 
way, the defendant could not have found these deeds. To use the 
words of Baxter C. J.:
The Registry Act provides for the keeping o f indexes and I think 
if a person searching a title uses all the means provided by the 
Act it would be an unreasonable construction o f the section re- 
latinj? to notice to hold that if there were any adventitious entry 
on the registry he must be held to have notice o f it. A ll that was 
intended by the section was that if a document was on the registry, 
which he might have seen in the course o f a proper search, he 
would be fixed with notice o f it, whether he actually looked at 
it or not.47
It should perhaps be observed that the registered document was 
subsequent to the plaintiff’s root of title.
(1 9 4 6 ), 15 M.P.R. 109.
‘7 Ibid., at p. 118.
